This paper examines, from the perspective of the pay-performance connection, the guideline principles recently issued by the Association of British Insurers (ABI) in connection with the operation of share-based incentive schemes. The four main dimensions to these guidelines concern: (i) phasing of issue by use of regular awards; (ii) setting of performance criteria (hurdles) against a peer group or bench-mark; (iii) restricting any re-testing of satisfaction of such performance criteria; and (iv) instituting a sliding scale of reward contingent on the performance out-turn against criteria. Emphasis is also placed on the accounting recognition challenge of reporting to shareholders the expected value of such rewards. Results are derived from a simulation over a 14 year period of the implementation of such guidelines in a sample of companies traded on the London Stock Exchange. Empirical results suggest that the pay-performance connection is not always made stronger by setting the hurdle ever higher, and that higher hurdles are best tempered by generosity in terms of re-testing and re-issue of options. The saving of expense on such packages may be bought at the expense of a weakened pay-performance connection at board level.
1.

Introduction
Since the passage of the Finance Act 1984, Executive Share Options (ESOs) have become an increasingly important component of executive remuneration. In addition to the tax advantages initially available by satisfying some relatively mild conditions, this means of remuneration continues to hold out the possibility of achieving a clear link between the executive's pay and company performance. From the initial outbreak of enthusiasm for this means of executive remuneration, the prospect of equity dilution through over zealous use of such schemes prompted institutional shareholders to take an interest. In particular, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) has, through the promulgation and dissemination of various codes of practice 2 , emerged as the lead organisation in the regulation of these share-based incentive schemes.
The most recent set of consolidated ABI guidelines was issued in March 2001 and comes after a prolonged process of external scrutiny of top executive pay practices and procedures. A process which through the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) , and Hampel (1998) reports can best be described as self-regulation 3 , although the recent proposal for the reform of company law in this area 4 represents a rare government intervention. One consequence of these various reports, and the Greenbury Report in particular, was to move companies away from ESOs towards more complex Long Term Incentive Plans (Ltips) 5 . Nevertheless, ESOs remain empirically important and continue to provide a standard against which other incentive pay schemes may be judged.
The new ABI (2001) guidelines mark a fairly radical departure from what has gone before. The detail of the development of these guidelines and the way in which they provide guidance to boards and remuneration committees is provided below but, in essence, the novelty comprises a move away from using the 'four-times-emoluments' guide as to a ceiling for option issue towards encouraging a 'phasing' of ESO issue in a regular manner in preference to having a somewhat lumpy issue once every three or four years. Markedly more emphasis is now placed on setting challenging performance criteria (or 'hurdles') before the ESOs vest, and performance is to be on a relative basis, using peer groups or performance bench marks. One version of a challenging performance criterion mentioned but not specifically required in the ABI guidelines, and certainly commonly touted in the business press, is the issue of executive share options with a strike price that is at a 'premium' to the market price. This alternative will also be examined below.
2 See, for example, Association of British Insurers (1987, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1999) . 3 Blundell and Robinson (1999) provide an extensive discussion on the prevalence and potential of such arrangements in the economy. 4 The main proposal being that shareholders should be allowed to vote on the report of the remuneration committee. See the original discussion paper DTI (1999) . 5 For an examination of the impact of this move to Ltips, see Buck, Bruce, Main and Udueni (2001) .
In addition, remuneration committees are discouraged from permitting a second or further chance to meet the performance conditions ('re-testing') if they are not fully satisfied at the first opportunity 6 . Finally, the reward for the attainment of targets is encouraged to be on a sliding scale ( where the reward or proportion of options vesting increases with the level of performance once a certain threshold is surpassed). In all of this, it should be stressed that the actual ABI guidelines nowhere prescribe the behaviour of remuneration committees. Recommendations only are given 7 , exceptions are permitted, and remuneration committees and boards are free to depart from these guidelines.
Emphasis is also placed on reporting to shareholders the expected value of such rewards. This suggests a move away from the current practice of neither reporting 8 nor recognising the cost of servicing ESOs, a move which is wholly consistent with recent government proposals to bring reporting of executive pay more in line with the SEC (1993) regulations that apply in the USA. This challenge does, of course, highlight the difficulty of assessing the impact of the ABI guidelines on the pay-performance linkage confronting the executives being remunerated under such schemes 9 . There are sufficiently many inter-related conditions suggested by the new ABI guidelines that the question of evaluating their performance on the pay-performance rlationship looks intractable in terms of a theoretical approach. We are, therefore, forced to adopt a more empirical method of estimation whereby various combinations of the guidelines are simulated on data from a given set of companies.
This paper adopts an empirical approach to the study of the issues raised here, by conducting several simulations of the implementation of these guidelines in a sample of companies traded over a 14 year period on the London Stock Exchange. The method involves adopting various particular specifications of the guidelines and by applying them in each company to a representative chief executive at the start of 1984 and computing the reward that this person would earn under each specification as the 1984-1997 period unfolds. The fortunes of such representative executives in a sample of some 244 companies traded on the London Stock Market over the period is then used to produce an average picture. For each of the hypothetical company chief executives, the pay performance correlation is analysed to produced a summary measure of how each configuration of the guidelines fares.
In the following section of the paper, some background information is provided concerning the development of the ABI guidelines over the years. This is then followed by a section which explains how the empirical data are constructed. The next section 6 Options typically vest after three years and the performance period is usually the most recent three or fouryear period. 7 This is seen, for example, in paragraph 2.1 of the Guidelines which states 'Remuneration committees are expected to have regard to these Guidelines in developing and implementing share incentive schemes.' 8 In fact, UITF (Abstract 10) of the Accounting Standards Board (1994) does require basic option-related information to be reported in a footnote to the accounts. 9 For earlier work examining the pay-performance relationship brought about by executive share options, see Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) and Yermak (1995) . And for a discussion of UK policy in this area, see Main (1999) .
then presents an analysis of the results obtained and the papers ends by offering some policy discussion in the light of the conclusions that can be drawn from these results.
Background to the ABI guidelines
In an attempt to foster the adoption of a more explicit culture of performance related pay in the board room 10 , the government of the day introduced the concept of 'approved share option schemes' under the Finance Act 1984. Until this point, any gains from ESOs were treated as income and taxed accordingly (up to a rather punitive top rate of 83% in early 1979). Although the top rate of income tax was reduced to 60% in 1979, the prospect held out by the Finance Act 1984 was that ESOs operating under certain restrictions could have their gains taxed as capital gains (which then faced a more attractive 30% tax rate). The principal restriction imposed by the Inland Revenue, in order to limit the tax expenditure implications of this concession, was that the face value (the exercise price times the number of shares under option) of options issued under such schemes should be limited to four times the annual emoluments of the relevant executive 11 .
With the vast majority of ESOs being serviced through shares by subscription (newly issued shares) rather than by acquisition (open market purchase), and with shares by subscription being neither recognised nor reported in the earnings statement, Institutional shareholders were alarmed at the prospect of equity dilution 12 . In drawing up a set of guidelines, the ABI seems to have reached for the existing Inland Revenue Code. The ABI guidelines were almost universally adopted 13 , to the extent that it almost became a rule or an entitlement that all executives at board room level would be issued with options to the value of four times emoluments. The fact that such a uniform distribution of ESOs is unlikely to represent an efficient outcome in terms of providing individual executives with the appropriate incentive -a situation that is likely to vary from company to company and, indeed, executive to executive -was highlighted by Main (1994) . Admittedly, revised ABI guidelines subsequently included provision for so-called 'super options' at eight times emoluments but the performance conditions 14 were sufficiently steep to deter most companies from using them. 10 Performance related pay can be viewed as part of the contractual approach to corporate governance (see Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) for a more detailed review and discussion). 11 There were also Inland revenue conditions requiring a minimum three year vesting period and a maximum 10-year life. Annual emoluments are roughly base pay plus bonus with an allowance for the cash equivalent of benefits in kind. 12 One impact of the Greenbury and Hampel reports has been a reversal of this pattern and an increased propensity to use market purchases of share to meet vesting of awards under Ltips and ESOs. 13 Main (1993) provides a description of the organisational arrangements for pay setting in the board room. 14 These demanded a minimum vesting period of five years and growth in earnings per share that placed the company in the upper quartile of the FTSE-100 performance.
Although the intention of the ABI was always that their guidelines should be used by boards and remuneration committees to guide their remuneration policy, a succession of revisions (concerning issues such as the entitlement to reissue options within a ten year period if a previous tranche had been exercised) resulted in these very ABI guidelines effectively being used as the 'rules' by boards and remuneration committees. This in spite of the fact that any tax advantage gained by adhering to the original Inland Revenue conditions for approval had to a large extent swept away with the Finance Act 1988 which not only reduced the top rate of income tax to 40% but harmonised the tax payer's capital gains tax with their marginal income tax rate 15 . Only with the Greenbury Report (1995) did the ABI guidelines lose their pre-eminence, and then only due to a movement by companies toward Ltips and away from ESOs. The latest ABI (2001) guidelines can be seen as an attempt to include all share-based executive incentive schemes 16 , but it also represents a marked departure from its previous implicit one-size-fits-all approach.
Companies are now free to issue options at some proportion of an executive's base pay and to do so on an annual basis. In return, however, perhaps stung by the widespread past criticisms of what are widely (but often incorrectly 17 ) perceived to have been unnecessarily generous ESOs, the ABI has included some strong encouragement toward the inclusion of demanding performance criteria. These criteria are required to be relative to a peer group of companies or to some benchmark performance standard.
The salient aspects of the new guidelines are as follows:
(i) condones the move away from the traditional option scheme with its four times emoluments limit towards phased grants -on an annual or some other regular basis: ('PHASING').
(ii) the use of challenging performance criteria relative to an appropriately defined peer group or other relevant benchmark, with total shareholder return being acceptable as the primary criterion where it is supported by a defined secondary financial criterion, e.g. earnings per share . Performance criteria should demand median level performance but with a sliding scale towards superior performance: ('RELPERF'). (iii) a single predetermined performance measurement period is encouraged and the ability to 'retest' performance over successive periods if performance originally falls short is discouraged: (no 'RETESTING'). (iv) while the issuing of options with a strike price at a premium to the prevailing market price is not accepted as a substitute for performance conditions, i.e. performance hurdles, it is mentioned: 'PREMIUM'. 15 The residual tax benefit lay in avoiding any tax until the underlying shares themselves were sold (as opposed to the options being exercise) and the tax shield provided by the annual capital gains tax allowance -something most senior executives are likely to have exhausted in any case). 16 And, indeed, in recent years there has also been a swing back to executive share options in preference to the complexity of Ltips. 17 See Main, O'Reilly, and Crystal (1994) and Conyon and Murphy (2000) for some comparative evidence on CEO pay.
As indicated above, the new guidelines emphasise the importance of providing some notion of the expected value of the awards granted from the outset. Under the UITF(Abstract 10) guidance of the Accounting Standards Board (1994), the annual accounts are required to contain the basic information that might allow the calculation of such values, but the reality is that the existence of performance conditions and other restrictions ensure that only the most approximate of estimates can be made from these data.
The main thrust of all of the regulations is investor protection through avoidance of hidden liabilities in executive contracts and to ensure that the executive earns any shares awarded. No attempt is made in the UK to inhibit executives from counteracting the incentive aspects of ESOs by taking a countervailing position in the company's shares through hedging in the derivatives market, although Company Law requirements on the disclosure of contract for difference may effectively rule out such actions. In the USA, Schizer (1999) explains the general absence of such behaviour as a generally accidental outcome of the tax code. Boards in the UK are, however, enjoined from reissuing options that are 'under water', a practice that, nevertheless, Samuels and Lymer (1996) documented 18 in practice.
The following section of the paper explains the approach adopted here to gauge the empirical impact of the guidelines sketched above for the connection between executive pay and performance. We also provide some information regarding the expected costs of various aspects of the new guidelines.
Empirical Estimation
The Risk Measurement Services Data Archive between March 1984 and March 1997 is used as the source of company observations. To provide comparable data and to allow the executive portfolios of share options to accumulate companies with a continuous availability of share price, shareholder return and earnings per share data are selected. This yields a sample of 244 companies. Due to the data requirements imposed, there will, of course, be a survivor bias in this sample and no claim can be made general applicability of the levels of the pay-performance connection estimated. Nevertheless, it remains useful to study the relative impact of the changing versions of the ABI guidelines on the pay-performance relationship in this sample.
In each case, the approach adopted is to follow a hypothetical Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in each company over the entire period. The CEO is assumed to receive £100,000 per annum in emoluments (in £1997) and for various combinations of the ABI guidelines an ESO portfolio is accumulated and monitored over the period. Clearly, for the first four years the ESO scheme, portfolios simply accumulate, but thereafter it is possible to generate measures of total remuneration as the various vintages of options conditionally vest and are exercised according to the particular combination of ABI guidelines being studied. For each possible combination of guidelines, therefore, it is possible to generate 244 observations over some 10 years in terms of the pay outcome for the executives and the respective performance of the companies involved. Various descriptive and summary statistics of the pay-performance relationship that emerged can then be studied.
As one of the key considerations in the ABI guidelines is the concept of relative performance, it is also necessary to generate a performance bench mark. The alternative would have been to define a peer group for each of the companies and to measure each company's performance against its particular peer group. This, however, would introduce an additional degree of heterogeneity in an exercise that is attempting to reach some general observations regarding the impact of the ABI guidelines. It was, therefore, decided to use common benchmarks for the two performance variables, total shareholder return and growth in earnings per share. Performance at the median and upper quartile of the FTSE-100 companies is a widely used standard 19 . This is available for the RMS data base. Before June 1986, however, there was no FTSE-100 marker and in its place membership of the FTA Share Index is used. But for the majority of the time period under study, performance is measured relative to the median (for any vesting ) and the upper quartile (for full vesting) of the FTSE-100.
As explained above, the main dimensions of ESO schemes examined include: the phasing of option issue ('PHASING'); the use of meaningful relative performance criteria ('RELPERF'); re-testing allowed of attainment of performance hurdles ('RETESTING'); options issued at a premium to the market ('PREMIUM'); new issues of ESOs as and when the CEO qualifies under any phasing condition ('NEWISSUE'). In each of these scenarios, the year-to-year valuation of the outcomes is measured and, in addition, the year-to-year variations in the executive's wealth as measured by the Black-ScholesMerton valuation of the ESOs is calculated 20 . The first approach presents an ex-post view of remuneration, and the second an approximate accounting valuation of the contemporaneous changes in CEO wealth over the period.
In total, there are six variations of ESO package design that are tested. These are delineated in Table 1 . There are, clearly, more than six combinations of the conditions listed above, but these combinations seem the most obvious to test in terms of the pay-performance relationship the various conditions produce. In terms of the performance criteria, the options vest (and are assumed to be immediately exercised) only after a minimum holding period of four years. This is longer than the usual official three-year condition, but the complication of closed periods for director equity transactions and other institutional features suggest that this is not too far from reality. When relative performance conditions apply, the vesting is dependent on the company in question attaining both: (i) at least median performance on total shareholder return; and (ii) an annual growth in earnings per share of retail price index plus three percentage points 21 over the previous three years. The extent of the vesting is decided on a pro-rata basis 22 with median total shareholder return earning 0% of entitlement and upper quartile earning 100%. For those circumstances in which share options are issued at a premium exercise price, the premium assumed is the current market price on the day of issue plus 25%.
Analysis of Results
Restricting the sample to non-financials, a total of 244 companies in the Risk Measurement Services Data Archive are found to have complete data on share price, 21 In recent practice, rpi+3%, or even rpi+4%, is not uncommon. 22 Although the actual guidelines refer to 'sliding scales between top quartile and median performance', the initial reward at the median may start at 25% of possible shares rather than 0%, and the maximum 100% vesting may occur at top quartile performance, thus resulting in performance-pay 'flat-spots'.
volatility, and earnings per share in the period 1984 through 1997. A list of these companies is given in Appendix A. For each company, a representative Chief Executive Officer is treated as having and annual base pay of £100,000 (in £1997). This simplification plays no role in the subsequent analysis, which focuses on the proportional change in remuneration for change in company performance. Starting in 1984 each executive is followed through 1997 and, depending on the exact set of rules in place (see Table 1 ), that executives qualification for share options is monitored and their options holdings valued on a yearly basis with the appropriate exercises, lapses, and new issues duly recorded. The first four years of data are necessary to bring the executive's into an 'equilibrium' state in terms of the option plans (as a three year minimum vesting period produces an effective four year cycle on such schemes), and this leaves 10 years of data for analysis.
Two pay variables are computed. The first, labelled 'Pay', is simply the base pay plus any realised option gains from the executive share option holdings. Thus:
Where, P t = prevailing share price at time t SP j = strike price of options issued at time j NEX j,t is the number of share options of vintage j that are exercised in period t.
The second pay measure is more complex than the out-turn measure presented above. This second measure, labelled 'Pay2', includes all the realised and unrealised gains to the option holdings of the executive in the relevant year. This is done by using a BlackScholes-Merton approach to place a crude market value on the option holdings of the executive at each year-end in the history. As discussed above, it is recognised that for well-known reasons this can only be an approximation to the wealth enhancement of the executive due to ESO holdings. Most obviously, the change in wealth so measured ignores the fact that the options being valued may not have vested, that the options cannot be traded but only exercised by the nominated executive, and that there is an additional risk owing to the chance of the executive being fired or the company being taken over 23 .
Thus 'Pay2' can be written: 
Where, Number j,t = number of shares under option of vintage j that are held at period t. This will vary over time as some are exercised and some lapse, either due to time limitations or due to failure to attain performance-criteria hurdles that are part of the vesting requirements of the company's executive share option plan. For j = t, these are new issues. (Note that, for j ≠ t, Number j,t is first reduced by NEX j,t ).
BS j,t is the Black-Scholes valuation of an option on the company's shares issued under the company's executive share option plan at time j and valued at time t, thus:
where, N(d) is the cumulative normal distribution function. T is the valid life remaining on he option. σ is the volatility of the share. r f is the risk free rate. r d is the dividend yield. Table 2 provides a time series of the sample average for these two pay variables ('Pay' and 'Pay2') over the years 1988 through 1997 as estimated under the conditions of the various sets of assumptions underlying the models, e.g., 'Model A' the raditional form of non-phased 4-times-emoluments execuitve share option grant, with no performance conditions. It can be seen from the table that, even from this sample-average perspective of executive pay, there is a substantial difference between the two measures of remuneration. The movements in the measure 'Pay2' are more marked although less extreme than those of 'Pay'. The data are plotted in Figure 1 for each of the 6 variations of the model of executive remuneration. These will be discussed at greater length below when the connection with company performance is investigated. Table 3 provides an initial comparison of the scheme type by presenting the distribution of total pay over the 10 years and across the 244 companies under analysis. The first thing to note is that, at the end of the day and using the mean of total pay over the 10 years, the two pay measures are remarkably close. This is exactly what is to be expected, as they are measuring the same thing, albeit in different ways. Pay gains ascribed to an executive under the 'Pay2' measure are often reversed as the company's performance falters. The 'Pay' measure, on the other hand, records only the actual gains realised (as well as base pay). As we shall see in Table 4 , however, the measure 'Pay2' may do a better job in terms of revealing the connection between the executive's fortunes and those of the company. This is particularly clear in the cased of Model A, the traditional 1984-type of scheme. Here, the 'Pay' measure captures the realised gains, especially in 1988 resulting from the bull market of the late 1980s. The 'Pay2' measure is more modest because it allows for the price reversals and the price gains within a particular year.
The second point to note is that the exact design of the share option scheme has only a modest impact on the average level of pay-out. By imposing a condition of phasing (Model B) does moderate the 'Pay' measure and the lumpy realisation of capital gains. But imposing performance hurdles (Model C) has remarkably little impact. As long as re-testing of the performance hurdle is permitted, the executive is, on average, at little disadvantage through having pay tied to company performance. It is only with the imposition of a no-retesting condition (Model D) that the recorded gains in remuneration are moderated. Similarly, issuing share options at a premium to market (Model E) has a proportional if modest effect on reducing total pay. But, again, when a no-retesting condition is imposed (as in Model F) remuneration levels fall to the lowest in the sample of scheme designs.
Of course, parsimony in pay is one thing, but it may be a false economy if it is bought at the price of a diminished pay-performance relationship. It is to this that we now turn. Taking one scheme type at a time, for each of the 244 sample companies a simple regression is conducted using the 10 yearly observations (1988-97) of pay and total shareholder return for that company. Thus:
The 244 estimates of the pay-performance sensitivity (β) so obtained for each scheme describe the enhancement in the executive's remuneration (£) for every percentage increase in shareholder wealth. The estimated coefficients are grouped as the lowest 10%, the lowest 25% (lower quartile), the middle 50% (inter-quartile range), the top 25% (upper quartile) and the top 10%. The average coefficient within each of these groups is presented in Table 4 . The significance of the average β figure for group k is computed as a t-statistic in the form:
where N k = the number of firms in the group k of firms β i = the regression coefficient estimated as in equation (6) for firm i σ i = the standard error of coefficient β i in regression for firm i
Concentrating initially on the inter-quartile range values (Middle 50%), the first thing that stands out in Table 4 is the marked difference between the results for the pay measure 'Pay' and the measure 'Pay2'. Coefficients in the lower part of Table 4 ('Pay2') are, in general, several times larger than those in the upper part ('Pay'). For Model A the ratio is over 10 and is at lest 4 times the outturn pay-performance measure (Pay) in the other variants and almost seven times higher in the two models that do not allow retesting (Models D and F), thus demonstrating the potential gains that are lost when a performance hurdle is not attained.
It has already been established above (in Table 3 ) that these two variables capture much the same the same thing over the lifetime of any share option scheme. But the important observation here is that, in terms of gauging the efficacy of a scheme in terms of tying pay ('remuneration') to performance, the more time-sensitive measure 'Pay2', which utilises the changing value of the executive's share option portfolio by use of Black-Scholes valuations, reveals to a fuller extent the degree to which the fortunes of an executive are tied to the performance of the company. This suggests that, in terms of ABI reporting and communication with shareholders, the 'Pay2' measure may be the more obvious to use. The problem with the more straightforward 'Pay' measure is that it lacks time-sensitivity, as the realised option gains may occur substantially later than the performance that merited the reward.
The second feature to emerge form Table 4 is the very different outcomes achieved by different variants of executive share-option schemes. In terms of establishing an empirically strong connection between executive pay and firm performance, Model C (phasing with performance hurdles but re-testing allowed) does best, both judged by the middle 50% of companies (£4996 for the Pay2 measure) and by examining the more extreme outcomes (£2769 for the lowest 10% and £8853 for the highest 10%). Once the re-testing facility is removed (in Models D and F) the pay-performance connection becomes much weaker, falling for the middle 50% in terms of the Pay2 measure to £3085 and £2526 respectively.
In the context of reporting expected (and, indeed, out-turn) values of executive share option schemes, it is interesting to recall the results presented in Table 3 , which demonstrates that the total (or average) costs of these schemes varies relatively little over models B, C and E. Whether measured by the 'Pay' or the 'Pay2' measure the average cost of these schemes is quite similar. By restricting re-testing (Models D and F), the overall costs can be reduced. But, in these last two cases, the pay-performance relationship is seriously weakened. In a similar vein, it is interesting to note that issuing options at a premium (or 25% to prevailing market price in the case of Model F) reduces costs fairly proportionately, but also reduces the pay-performance relationship.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This paper has detailed several aspects of the recent moves by the ABI to condition what remuneration committees offer by way of executive share options. There are many motivations underlying these changes and we have focused on but one of them, namely the impact on the pay-performance relationship between the executive and the firm. What emerges in the results discussed above is that additional constraints, which attempt to raise the performance standard by raising the hurdle, may indeed succeed in enhancing the pay-performance connection. It is, however, possible to be overly restrictiveresulting in a hurdle that is set so high that few get over it, with the consequence that the connection between pay and performance is actually diminished (for example, Model D or Model F with no re-testing versus Model C).
In terms of effective communication with shareholders and other stakeholders, the very different results obtained with remuneration measure 'Pay' versus the measure 'Pay2' serves to emphasise the advantage of portraying the impact of pay-performance devices in a contemporaneous way, particularly as seen from the perspective of the executive. Of course, many of the 'paper' gains made and subsequently lost on an executive's option portfolio may well be discounted against this eventuality in the eyes of the executive, but the important thing is to offer an alternative perspective from the narrow ex-post out-turn option gains as included in the simple 'Pay' measure. This commonly used measure emphasises winners and fails to capture the ups and downs of executive share option holding -far from a one-way bet when they represent foregone or deferred basic remuneration.
Use of an evolving Black-Scholes method of valuing the executive's portfolio of share options, as in 'Pay2, produces a clear and timely result. Waiting to record the actual exercise of options and the realised gains, as in 'Pay', will record the same transfer of wealth form the shareholders to the executive, but it will be done in a way whereby the timing obscures the true nature of the relationship. On the other hand, as the ABI guidelines (2001, Appendix 2) recognise, the existence of performance hurdles and retesting restrictions complicates the expected valuation of option grants.
From a policy perspective, it might be useful if the ABI and other involved parties could recommend boards and remuneration committees to set performance conditions that are neither too easy nor to tough to achieve. Excessive severity in management incentive schemes is in no-one's interest. Furthermore, where performance conditions are set, they should possibly be tempered with a measure of generosity in terms of re-testing and reissue of options 24 .
In terms of accounting policy, there also seems to be a case for heading the pleas of the International Accounting Standards Board and encouraging the accounting profession to start reporting and recognising the expense of executive share option schemes, using methods that utilise Black-Scholes or some other market-equivalent based method of option valuation.
Government policy in this area seems to be developing along the lines of allowing shareholders to have a vote on the remuneration report 25 . As can be seen from the calculations above, such an arrangement will demand a considerable amount of elucidation of the likely characteristics of the recommended remuneration policy. Above all, these circumstances will reward a considerable amount of simplicity and transparency in the design of the remuneration scheme.
Finally, for boards and remuneration committees, the challenges are high and getting higher, but so too are the stakes. Increasing company performance through designing executive remuneration packages may seem a rather indirect approach, but for the nonexecutive members on the board it may offer the most effective route in the face of bounded rationality and informational asymmetry. • Pay and Pay2 defined in footnote to Table 3 
